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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
It is submitted, in conclusion, that in deciding whether or not
defendant's uncontradicted direct evidence should entitle him to a
peremptory ruling, a court should first determine whether or not the
particular presumption has a logical core, i.e. a basis in probability.
If it does not, the ruling should be given, providing there is no
shadow upon the credibility of the defendant's evidence. If the pre-
sumption does have a basis of probability, then the weight of this
probability should be balanced against the evidence of the defendant,
as in any other case of conflict between circumstantial evidence (not
raising a technical presumption) and direct evidence, and a peremp-
tory ruling for defendant given or refused upon the usual test of
whether or not reasonable minds could reach only one conclusion.
J. FRAZIER GLENN, JR.
Insurance-Insurable Interest in Life of Copartner
A and H, partners in an insurance business, each took out a policy
on his life for the benefit of the partnership. The premiums were paid
out of the earnings of the business. There was a partnership disso-
lution, A selling all of his interest, except accounts and notes receiv-
able. H surrendered the policy on A's life and demanded the cash
surrender value. A made demand for his proportionate share.
Held: that the policy, together with its cash surrender value, was a
partnership asset which passed to H.1
The instant case seems undoubtedly correct on the basis that if a
partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, then a
partnership has an insurable interest in the life of a partner. 2
Wagering policies were abolished in England by statutes.3 Amer-
ican courts have generally held, irrespective of statutes, that wager-
thermore, it is often difficult to decide when a witness is, in a legal sense,
uncontradicted. He rhay be contradicted by circumstance as well as by state-
ments of others contrary to his own. In such cases, courts and juries are not
bound to refrain from exercising their judgment and to blindly adopt the state-
ments of the witness, for the simple reason that no other witness has denied
them, and that the character of the witness is not impeached." By Rapallo,
J., Elwood v. Western Union Co., 45 N. Y. 549, 553 (1871).
'Allen v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
'If a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner, he has
it whether it is the whole or a fractional -part of the beneficial interest in the
policy. Since he has a fractional interest in the partnership, it would seem
that he had an insurable interest.
819 Geo. II, c. 37 and 14 Geo. III, c. 48.
NOTES A4ND COMMENTS
ing policies are against public policy.4 An insurable interest in the
lifd of another, which takes the policy out of the wagering class, has
been defined as that interest arising by the relation of blood,
5 or
marriage, 6 or business7 which gives a reasonable expectation of se-
curing benefit from the continuance of the life insured.
8 It is gen-
erally held that a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his
copartner. 9
The North Carolina case of Powell v. Dewey
10 is generally con-
sidered as contrary to the proposition that a partner has an insurable
interest in the life of his copartner. But strictly speaking, that case
is limited to the situation where there is no capital invested. The
statement in Powell v. Dewey that it "is against the weight of au-
thority" to assert that an insurable interest arises merely from the
continuance of a partnership seems to be wholly unwarranted, and
has no authority in support.
1 Moreover, Powell v. Dewey seems
unwarrantedly to limit the effect of dictum in Trinity College v. In-
surance Co.12 The recent trend in the North Carolina decisions
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 125, n. 128. New Jersey seems to be alone in
holding to contrary. (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 296, comment on Howard v. Bene-
ficial Assoc., 98 N. J. Law 297, 118 Atl. 449 (1922).
'Lincoln S. Cain, Insurable Interest in Life (1926) 6 BosToN L. REv. 111,
120.
'Supra note 5.
'Mace v. Provident Life Association, 101 N. C. 122, 7 S. E. 674 (1888)
(debtor-creditor); U. S. v. Supple-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U. S. 189, 44
Sup. Ct. 546, 68 L. ed 970 (1924) (corporation has an insurable interest in life
of an officer) ; Embry's Adm'r. v. Harris, 104 Ky. 61, 52 S. W. 958 (1899)
(surety may insure life of his principal) ; International Life Ins. Co. v. Car-
rol, 17 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) (three insolvents, jointly and severally
liable on sundry obligation made in joint real estate deals, had an insurable
interest in the lives of each other).
'VANCE, INSURANCE (1904) 129.Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498, 2 Sup. Ct. 949,
27 L. ed. 800 (1883) ; Adam's Adm'r. v. Reed, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 858, 38 S. W.
420 (1896) ; Rahders, Merritt & Hagler v. Peoples Bank of Minneapolis, 113
Minn. 496, 130 N. W. 16 (1911); Rush v. Howkins, 135 Ga. 128, 68 S. E.
1035 (1910) ; Atkins v. Cotter, 145 Ark. 326, 224 S. W. 624 (1920) ; Bevin v.
The Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244 (1854); Fleming v. Fleming,
194 Iowa 71, 184 N. W. 296 (1921). Texas and Colorado hold that insurable
interest ceases at the dissolution of the partnership and recovery can not be
had thereafter. Cheeves v. Anders, 87 Texas 287, 28 S. W. 274 (1894) ; Ruth
v. Flynn, 26 Colo. App. 171, 142 Pac. 194 (1914).
"123 N. C. 103, 31 S. E. 381 (1898).
it Supra note 9.
113 N. C. 244, 248, 18 S. E. 175, 176 (1893), which states: "Under certain
conditions a partner has an insurable interest in the life of his copartner.
Insurance Co. v. Luchs. 108 U. S. 498. So one who is interested pecuniarily
in the future earnings of another under a contract with him as an insurable
interest in his life."
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seems to indicate a more liberal view toward validating life insurance
policies.' 3 A possible relaxation of the "partnership view" may per-
haps be found in the construction of incontestable clauses.14
A. K. SMITH,
CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR.
Master and Servant-Liability for Injury to Invitee
of Truck Driver
Is a truck owner liable for injuries to a boy who, invited to
ride on the running board by the driver without authority, was
injured when he was thrown off as the truck rounded a corner at
a rapid rate? The court held that the driver exceeded the scope
of his employment in inviting the boy to ride.' A similar result was
reached in another case when the secretary-treasurer of a company
invited plaintiff's intestate to ride in a company car which was
wrecked at a street intersection.2 No evidence was introduced to
show that the secretary was given to the habit of carrying passengers
without authorization. Had this been established, defendant com-
pany might have been charged with constructive notice of violation
of its rule and hence, with its abrogation.8
It is generally conceded that a servant has no implied authority
"In Hardy v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 152 N. C. 286, 67 S. E. 767 (1910),
after a thorough review of Trinity College v. Ins. Co., supra note 12, Powell
v. Dewey, supra note 10, Burbage v. Windley's Ex'rs., 108 N. C. 351, 128 S. E.
839, 12 L. R. A. 409 (1891), Hinton v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 135
N. C. 314, 47 S. E. 474, 65 L. R. A. 161 (1904), it was decided that, although
prior North Carolina cases seemed to refuse to allow the good faith assign-
ment of life insurance to persons having no insurable interest, an assignment
would be valid where it was not a cloak to a wagering contract or transaction.
In American Trust Co. v. Life Ins. Co. of Va. supra note 7, the validity of
N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §1126 (5) 'passed as a result of Victor v.
Louise Mills, 148 N. C. 107, 61 S. E. 648 (1908)] giving every corporation an
insurable interest in the life of any officer or agent whose death would cause
financial loss to the corporation, was recognized.
"
4 In American Trust Co. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 173 N. C. 558, 560, 92 S. E.
706, 709 (1917), there is the following dictum: "There is authority for the
position that the incontestable clause in a policy of insurance covers every
defense except that there was no insurable interest at the time of issuing the
policy (5 Elliott on Contracts, §4077), although the trend of modern authority
is that the clause, when it takes effect within a reasonable time after the issue
of the -policy and not from the date, cuts off all defenses except those specially
allowed by the clause itself."
I Cotton v. Carolina Truck Co.. 197 N. C. 709, 150 S. E. 505 (1929).
'Collar v. Grocery Co., 150 S. E. 2 (W. Va. 1929).
'Hammond v. Coal Co., 105 W. Va. 423, 143 S. E. 91 (1928).
